In this paper, we revisit a long-standing question on the structure of strategyproof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz (1972) ). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auctiondesign, we show that in a specific quasi-linear domain, every Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof SCF satisfying non-bossiness and a mild continuity property is dictatorial. The result holds for an arbitrary number of agents but the two-person version does not require either the non-bossiness or continuity assumptions. It also follows that the dictatorship conclusion holds on any superset of this domain. We also provide a minimum consumption guarantee result in the spirit of Serizawa and Weymark (2003) .
Introduction
The problem of allocating goods among a set of agents who have preferences over these goods is a familiar one in economic theory. A minimal and uncontroversial requirement for such allocations is Pareto-efficiency. However, in order to satisfy this requirement, knowledge of agents' preferences is essential. If these preferences are private information, they must be elicited from agents. Consequently, the allocation procedure or social choice function (SCF) must also be incentive-compatible; that is, the SCF must induce agents to reveal their preferences truthfully. The most attractive incentive-compatibility requirement is strategyproofness; if a SCF is strategy-proof, then no agent can benefit by lying irrespective of her beliefs regarding the announcements of other agents. Strategy-proofness is however, a stringent requirement. According to the well-known Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard (1977) and Satterthwaite (1975) ), an SCF defined over an unrestricted domain with a range of at least three alternatives is strategy-proof only if it is dictatorial. A dictatorial SCF is a trivial SCF which always picks the best outcome for a given agent.
In many contexts, it is natural to assume that agent preferences are restricted. In such cases the dictatorship result may not hold. An extensive literature has developed investigating the structure of strategy-proof SCFs in models with single-peaked preferences, quasilinear preferences with money as a numeraire good and so on. In this paper, we consider another well-known restricted domain model, that of a classical exchange economy. There is a fixed amount of m goods, m ≥ 2, which have to be distributed among n agents n ≥ 2. Agent preferences are defined over bundles of m goods that are assumed to be strictly increasing, continuous and strictly convex. Although there are several papers on this model there is as yet no comprehensive characterization of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient SCFs on the domain consisting of all such preferences (see the literature review below). The goal of our paper is to investigate these questions using techniques adapted from auction design theory. One of our results is an almost complete answer to the characterization question referred to earlier.
Literature Review
The classic paper on incentive-compatibility in exchange economies is Hurwicz (1972) . It shows that there do not exist strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational SCFs in a two-agent world. Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) also consider the two agent case and show that every efficient and strategy-proof SCF is dictatorial when the domain of agent preferences is the set of all (strictly) convex and monotone orderings. Zhou (1991) extends this result to the case of classical preferences, i.e., those that are (strictly) convex, monotone and continuous. There are several variants of this result (all for two agents) for restricted domains, for example Schummer (1997) for linear preferences, Ju (2003) for classical quasi-linear and CES and Hashimoto (2008) for Cobb-Douglas preferences. There are significant difficulties involved in extending these results to the case of an arbitrary number of agents. Zhou (1991) conjectured that efficient dictatorial SCFs in the case of n ≥ 3 must be inversely dictatorial.
1 Kato and Ohseto (2002) have shown by means of an example that the conjecture is false. If the domain is non-classical, it is possible to construct SCFs that are strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient and non-dictatorial. For instance, Nicoló (2004) shows that in the domain of Leontief preferences, fixed-price trading rules are strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient. Serizawa (2006) and Serizawa and Weymark (2003) provide results for strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions for general n. The latter shows that every strategyproof and efficient SCF violates a minimum consumption guarantee or MCG assumption. In particular, for every ϵ > 0 there exists a profile and an agent whose allocation is less than ϵ in terms of the Euclidean norm. Although this result is illuminating, it is far from being a characterization. In particular, it says nothing about the value of a Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof SCF at an arbitrary profile. Serizawa (2006) proves a dictatorship result by strengthening strategy-proofness to effective pairwise strategy-proofness. Effective pairwise strategy-proofness requires pairs of agents not to have a "self-enforcing manipulation" in addition to strategy-proofness. A manipulation by a pair of agents is self-enforcing if it does not decrease the utility of either agents in the pair, increases utility of at least one and neither of the agents has an incentive to betray his partner. Note that effective pairwise strategy-proofness, like notions such as group strategy-proofness, requires coordination between agents. However, if information is private, it is not clear how this coordination takes place.
We note that strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency and individual-rationality are incompatible in classical exchange economies. Hurwicz (1972) demonstrates this for two-good, two-agent models. Serizawa (2002) extends this result to an arbitrary numbers of agents and goods for all domains that include all homothetic preferences. Two other papers that deal with the n ≥ 2 agents case are Barberà and Jackson (1995) and Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) . These papers explore the implications of strategy-proofness and additional axioms (not including Pareto-efficiency) in classical exchange economies.
Our Results and Contribution
The starting point of our analysis differs from that in the existing literature. We consider a domain of classical quasi-linear preferences of the following kind:
Our main goal is to show that strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency imply dictatorship 1 An SCF is inversely dictatorial if there exists an agent whose allocation is zero at every preference profile.
in this domain (in the presence of some additional assumptions when there are three or more agents). In order to provide an insight into this result, we note that some implications of strategy-proofness in such domains are well understood from auction design theory. For instance, in a two-good version of the same model where u i (x i , y i ; θ i ) = θ i √ x i +y i with θ i > 0 strategy-proofness requires agent i's allocation of good x i to be a weakly increasing function of θ i for every n − 1 tuple θ −i , of types of other agents (see for example Myerson (1981) ).
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Moreover the allocation of good y i is determined by the Revenue Equivalence Theorem up to a constant that depends only on θ −i . Now consider the imposition of Pareto-efficiency. If the allocations of all agents are interior, the allocation of good x is independent of that of good y and is obtained as a solution to the problem of maximizing
x i subject to the resource constraints. The allocation of good y to agent i can thus be thought of as a Vickrey-Groves-Clarke (VCG) payment. Since Pareto-efficiency will also require the amounts of good y across agents to "add up", standard arguments about the "non-balancedness" of VCG mechanisms will also imply that achieving it will be impossible.
A general argument is less straightforward because there is no reason to assume that allocations are interior. If agents are constrained in the amount of goods they consume, the characterization of Pareto-efficient allocations in the previous paragraph is no longer valid. Consequently, strategy-proof SCFs can no longer be identified with VCG mechanisms and the earlier line of argumentation breaks down. However, we are able to show that in the case where there are at least three agents, strategy-proofness and efficiency in conjunction with non-bossiness and continuity implies dictatorship.
3 If there are two agents, the non-bossiness and continuity assumptions are redundant. An important observation is that all dictatorship results extend in a straightforward way to all supersets of this domain including the domain of all classical preferences. Using our methods, we also provide an elementary proof of the MCG result of Serizawa and Weymark (2003) .
We believe that our techniques may be useful in characterizing strategy-proof SCFs on domains where all preferences are not quasi-linear but contain "some" that are. The idea would be to use quasi-linear methods to completely describe strategy-proof SCFs on the quasi-linear sub-domain and extend the result to the larger domain. Another aspect of our contribution deserves mention. Our domain is a "single-crossing" domain in the following sense: a pair of indifference curves of two preference orderings for an agent in (x i , y i ) space can intersect at most once. This is the familiar Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing property, which is the cornerstone of the screening literature in the theory of asymmetric information. Although such domains are important from a theoretical standpoint, they have not received a great deal of attention in the strategy-proofness literature. An exception is Saporiti (2009) which considers domains over a finite number of alternatives.
4 An important observation is that single-crossing domains are not closed with respect to Maskin monotonic transformations. Loosely speaking, a Maskin monotonic transformation allows the indifference curve of an agent to be "bent upwards" at any interior commodity bundle -see Remark 1 and Footnote 9 for a definition and further elaboration. Existing papers on strategy-proofness in economic domains use these transformations in a central way (see Remark 1 again). Consequently, they do not cover single-crossing domains -we believe that ours is the first result on such domains.
Recently we have become aware of a related paper by Takeshi Momi (Momi (2013) ) written contemporaneously with ours. This paper extends the results in Serizawa and Weymark (2003) and Serizawa (2006) to a full-fledged dictatorship result. It considers the homothetic domain (like the earlier papers) and shows that every strategy-proof, efficient and non-bossy SCF for an arbitrary number of agents is dictatorial. The results in our papers are independent of each other because the domains considered are very different-the homothetic domain is not a single-crossing domain. However, the generalization of the Momi (2013) result to the entire domain of classical preferences is marginally stronger than our counterpart (Theorem 3). This is because we require a continuity assumption on SCFs on our sub-domain. We are unable to determine whether this assumption can be dispensed with.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our model, while Section 3 introduces and discusses quasi-linear domains. Results are contained in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.
Notation and Definitions
We consider an exchange economy with the set of agents I = {1, 2, ..., n} and the set of goods M = {1, 2, ..., m}. We assume that n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 2. Let the fixed total endowment of good j be denoted by Ω j and the total endowment vector to be Ω = (Ω 1 , Ω 2 , ..., Ω m ). We assume Ω j > 0, for all j ∈ M. The set of feasible allocations is the set ∆ = {(x i1 , . . . , x im )|x ij ≥ 0, for all j ∈ M and i ∈ I and 5 The asymmetric 4 See also Goswami (2011b) for another recent contribution to the literature on strategy-proofness on a single-crossing domain.
5 For a preference ordering R i and a vector x ∈ ℜ m + , the upper contour set of
n → ∆. We will let F i (R i , R −i ) denote the allocation to agent i at the profile (R i , R −i ) under the SCF F . 
and for all i ∈ I.
In the usual strategic voting model, an agent's preference ordering is private information and F represents the mechanism designer's objectives. If F is strategy-proof, all agents have dominant-strategy incentives to reveal their private information truthfully.
Let P E(R) denote the set of Pareto-efficient allocations at R.
The non-bossiness axiom was introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) . If an SCF is non-bossy, an agent who is unable to change her allocation by a unilateral deviation from a preference profile is also unable to change the allocation of any other agent by the same deviation. The axiom is particularly useful in restricting the class of strategy-proof SCFs in environments where an agent can be indifferent across outcomes. It has been widely used in the literature.
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An important and familiar SCF is dictatorship.
Definition 5 An SCF F is dictatorial if there exists an agent i such that for all R ∈ [D]
n ,
A dictatorial SCF gives all resources to the same agent at all preference profiles. It is of course both strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient but ethically unsatisfactory. Serizawa and Weymark (2003) introduce a condition that ensures that all agents receive a minimal bundle of goods.
Definition 6 An SCF F satisfies the Minimum Consumption Guarantee (MCG) axiom if there exists an ϵ > 0 such that for all profiles R ∈ [D] n and all i ∈ I,
Quasi-linear preferences are preference orderings that can be represented by utility functions of the form
8 These preferences are widely used in economic theory. In this paper, we restrict attention to a small sub-class of quasi-linear preferences that are represented by utility functions of the following form:
where θ i > 0. Observe that for each i and θ i , the preferences are symmetric across the first m − 1 goods. Note also that these preferences are classical. For notational convenience we denote the m th good by y. The set of preferences in (1) 
consists of all preference orderings that can be represented by utility functions of the form
The continuity of F can therefore be defined straightforwardly.
We emphasize that q-continuity is a relatively mild requirement because it imposes conditions only on the restriction of an SCF to the the domain D q .
7 Here || · || denotes the Euclidean norm. 8 A preference ordering R i is represented by the utility function
REMARK 1: The domain D q is "narrow" in a specific technical sense -it is a single-crossing domain. As mentioned in the Introduction, single-crossing domains are important in information economics but have not been adequately analyzed in mechanism design. Exceptions are Saporiti (2009) which considers a model with finite set of alternatives and Goswami (2011b) which looks at one-dimensional (i.e. two-good) models. Single-crossing domains present serious difficulties for mechanism design in economic environments -specifically they do not permit Maskin monotonic (MM) transformations.
9 These transformations are central to the characterization arguments in other domains in the literature (see for example, Momi (2013) , Serizawa and Weymark (2003) , Serizawa (2006) , Zhou (1991) , Hashimoto (2008) , Barberà and Jackson (1995) ) but are not admissible in D q . To see this, observe that if θ ′ i is an MM transformation of θ i , the gradient vectors of the two indifference curves at a commodity bundle must be the same. However this is impossible unless θ
Results
The results in the paper are as follows.
n → ∆ be a strategy proof and Pareto-efficient SCF. Then F does not satisfy MCG.
2 → ∆ be a strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient SCF. Then F is dictatorial.
n → ∆ be a strategyproof, Pareto-efficient, non-bossy and q-continuous SCF. Then F is dictatorial.
Theorem 1 is an MCG result for quasi-linear domains while Theorems 2 and 3 are dictatorship results.
This section is organized as follows. All the results depend critically on the structure of Pareto-efficient allocations in the domain D q . This is outlined in the next subsection together with an argument that allows us to reduce an m good problem to a two-good problem. The next subsection proves preliminary results on strategy-proofness in the two-good quasi-linear model following Myerson (1981) . The next three subsections prove and discuss each of the three results.
9 Let R i and R ′ i be two admissible preference orderings for i and let x i be a commodity bundle. We say that R
In other words, all commodity bundles that are weakly worse than x i under R i are also weakly worse than x i under R ′ i . Equivalently, the indifference curve for R ′ i through x i is obtained by "bending upwards" (at x i ) the indifference curve of R i through x i .
Pareto-efficiency in D q
As we have observed earlier, a profile in the domain D q is a non-negative n-tuple of real numbers θ. The set of Pareto-efficient allocations at a profile will be denoted by P E(θ). Allocations in this set satisfy the property below.
The proof of the result is contained in the Appendix. Thus every Pareto-efficient allocation has the feature that every agent i receives all goods from 1 through m − 1 in fixed proportions independently of θ i . This suggests a reduction of the problem from an m-good to a two-good model. The utility of agent i from a Pareto-
Now consider a two-good model with goods x 1 and y with endowments Ω 1 and Ω m respectively. Since
is a positive real number, it follows that the allocation (x * 1 , y * ) is Pareto-efficient in the two-good economy in the domain D q for the profile δ where
. Now consider an SCF F which is strategyproof and Pareto-efficient in the m-good economy. We can construct a two-good SCFF from F as follows: for every m-good profile θ,
where δ is defined as above. By our earlier arguments,F is Pareto-efficient. It is easily verified thatF is strategy-proof. For every strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient SCF in the m-good model, there is an "equivalent" (in the sense above) strategy-proof and Paretoefficient SCF in the two-good model. Henceforth, we restrict attention to the two-good model and the results generalize in an obvious way to the m-good case.
REMARK 2: Serizawa and Weymark (2003) , Serizawa (2002) and Momi (2013) reduce the problem to a two-agent characterization problem in smooth homothetic domains. They do it by fixing n − 1 agents' preferences at the same preference ordering. This can be done because Pareto-efficiency in a smooth homethetic domain requires agents' allocations to be proportional to each other. A similar reduction to a two-agent problem is not possible in quasi-linear domains because of the non-interiority of Pareto-efficient allocations in such domains.
In what follows, we consider two goods x and y and utility functions of the form
+ represents an allocation in P E(θ). Without loss of generality, we set the total endowments of both goods to 1.
The proposition below provides necessary conditions for allocations to be Pareto-efficient in the two-good model. 
k . According to condition (P 1), a constrained agent must not get a positive amount of good y. According to (P 2), any agent i whose x i exceeds a certain bound must get the entire amount of good y.
Strategy-proofness in D q
Lemmas 1 and 2 below are straightforward extensions of familiar results from auction design. Their proofs are omitted and can be found in Goswami (2011a) .
Henceforth, we shall denote F (θ) by the pair (x(θ), y(θ)) for all θ. The allocation to agent i at θ will be denoted by 
If F is strategy-proof, the allocation of x i to agent i must be weakly increasing in her type θ i (Lemma 1). Lemma 2 is an expression of the Revenue Equivalence Principle. The allocation of good x i to agent i at profile (θ i , θ −i ) determines the allocation of y i to the agent at that profile up to a constant that depends only on θ −i .
Suppose all agents in the coalition S, |S| ≥ 2, are unconstrained in some neighborhood. In addition, all agents in the complementary coalition I \ S get zero amounts of both goods. An application of Lemma 2 will imply that the allocation of good y to agents in S will correspond to VCG payments. Furthermore, Pareto-efficiency will also require these VCG payments to add up to one (the aggregate endowment of good y), i.e., the VCG payments will have to "balance". Proposition 3 below shows this to be impossible in the domain D q . The difficulty of balancing VCG transfers in auction theory or achieving full efficiency in public good environments is well known (see Hurwicz and Walker (1990) ).
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Proof : Suppose the Proposition is false; i.e., there exists S ⊂ I with |S| ≥ 2 and
k for all i ∈ S and ∑ i∈S y i (θ) = 1. Applying Lemma 2, it follows that for each θ ∈ N ϵ (θ ′ ) and i ∈ S,
where
in the LHS of (2) and letting
10 N ϵ (θ ′ ) = {θ : ||θ − θ ′ || < ϵ}.
Summing (3) across i and noting that
∑ i∈S y i (θ) = 1 we obtain,
Solving for the integrals in the LHS of (4) and simplifying further, we get
The LHS of (5) 
, where c(|S|) is a constant not equal to zero for any value of |S|.
11 However, the |S| th order cross-partial derivative of the RHS of (5) vanishes at all θ. We have a contradiction.
A restatement of Proposition 3 will be more convenient for our purpose.
Application of (P 1) in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 immediately yields the following result.
strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient. Then F does not satisfy S-interiority for any S.
Proposition 4 will be critical in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
Minimum Consumption Guarantees
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 1 which is an MCG result on the domain D q . It is independent of the result in Serizawa and Weymark (2003) and considerably easier to prove. In addition, our arguments are constructive -we are able to identify some profiles where 11 The LHS of (5) MCG fails. Of course, it implies the result for every superset of D q such as the domain of all classical preferences. Note that Theorem 1 is valid for all n but does not require either the non-bossiness or continuity axioms.
Proof of Theorem 1: It is sufficient to prove the result for a strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient
Let F be such an SCF. We first establish the following result.
Lemma 3 Let θ be a profile such that
. Now by strategyproofness and the fact that y i (θ i , θ −i ) = 0, we have
Returning to the proof of Theorem 1, choose any ϵ such that 0 < ϵ < √ 2. We show the existence of an agent i and a profile (θ
2). By Proposition 3 and (P 1) in Proposition 2 we know that there is a profile (θ i , θ −i ) ∈ O and an agent i such that
k . By Lemma 3 and the choice of ϵ, we have the following: for any θ
Observe that the RHS of this inequality converges to zero as θ
REMARK 3: Is it possible to directly relate MCG failure and dictatorship in particular domains? This appears to be a difficult question. Our argument for proving Theorem 1 uses a particular sequence of profiles along which the allocation of one agent approaches zero. Nothing can be said about the allocations of other agents -even the identity of the agent whose allocation is vanishing can change along the sequence. More importantly, non-trivial arguments are required to ensure that the limit profile belongs to the domain.
Dictatorship in the n = 2 case
The proof of Theorem 2 is contained in the Appendix. Below, we show by means of an example that the result does not hold if the set of types of the agents is both bounded above and bounded below away from zero.
This SCF is trivially strategy-proof because it is constant. It is also Pareto-efficient, which follows from Proposition 1.
REMARK 4: When preferences are non-classical, it is possible to construct a two-person non-dictatorial, strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient SCF -see Nicoló (2004) .
Dictatorship in the n ≥ 3 case
This case is different from the two agent case because strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient SCFs need not be dictatorial, as shown in Kato and Ohseto (2002) . We have already shown that in quasi-linear domains, a strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient SCF (for an arbitrary number of agents) must satisfy a highly restrictive property: at least one agent must receive a zero amount of good y in every neighborhood of profiles. If there are three or more agents, the identity of this agent could depend on the announcements of the other agents. This increases the possible complexity in the behavior of a strategy-proof SCF very dramatically. However, by imposing certain familiar regularity assumptions on SCFs, we are able to recover the dictatorship result.
Proof of Theorem 3: Let
n → ∆ be strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, non-bossy and q-continuous. We will show that F is dictatorial. We will first establish two lemmas.
Lemma 4 Let θ be an arbitrary profile and let
Proof : Let θ, i and S be as specified in the statement of Lemma 4. By (P2) in Proposition 2 we know that
, θ −i ) = 0 for r large enough. This contradicts (P 2) in Proposition 2. Hence,
for r large enough, which by strategy-proofness also implies y i (θ
Lemma 5 Let θ be an arbitrary profile and let S = {j ∈ I|y j (θ) > 0}. There exists a neighborhood N ϵ (θ ′ ) and S ′ ⊂ I with S ⊂ S ′ such that for allθ in the neighborhood, we have
Proof : Let θ be an arbitrary profile and let S = {j ∈ I|y j (θ) > 0}. If ∑ i∈S x i (θ) = 1 in a neighborhood of θ then Lemma 5 follows by the q-continuity of F . To see this note that by Pareto-efficiency only agents S are allocated positive amounts whereas those outside S get zero of both the goods. By q-continuity and finiteness of agents we will find a profile neighborhood around θ such that all the agents from the set S obtain positive amount of good y.
Hence consider an i / ∈ S and x i (θ) > 0 but y i (θ) = 0. Applying Lemma 4, it follows that there exists a profile θ ′ and a neighborhood N ϵ (θ ′ ) such that y k (θ ′′ ) > 0 and for all k ∈ S ∪ {i} for all θ ′′ in this neighborhood. Suppose there exists an agent i ′ with i ′ / ∈ S ∪ {i} such that x i ′ (θ ′′ ) > 0 and y i ′ (θ ′′ ) = 0 for some θ ′′ in this neighborhood. Applying Lemma 4 again, we can find another neighborhood such that for all profiles θ in this neighborhood,
Proceeding in this way and using the fact that the number of agents is finite, the desired conclusion obtains.
We show that F is dictatorial. In order to see this, suppose that there exists θ and S ⊂ I with |S| ≥ 2 such that y i (θ) > 0 for all i ∈ S. By Lemma 5, there exists a neighborhood N ϵ (θ ′ ) and a set of agents
. However, this implies that F satisfies S ′ -interiority, contradicting Proposition 4. Therefore |S| = 1 for all profiles. By Paretoefficiency, this implies that for all θ there exists an agent i such that F i (θ) = (1, 1). A simple argument using non-bossiness establishes that F is dictatorial.
Finally, let D q ⊂ D and F : [D] n → ∆ be strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, non-bossy and q-continuous. We know from our earlier arguments that F restricted to the domain D q is dictatorial. Let i be the dictator. Pick an arbitrary profile 1) . By repeating this argument, it follows that F i (R) = (1, 1) so that i is the dictator for F .
REMARK 5:
There are open questions relating to our non-bossiness and q-continuity assumptions. A reasonable conjecture is that strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency imply the extreme-valuedness of F for the domain D q , i.e. at all profiles, there exists an agent who receives the entire allocation of all goods. Momi (2013) has shown that q-continuity is not required for the dictatorship result for classical preferences. He also proves an extremevaluedness result for classical preferences for the case n = 3. Proving results without nonbossiness in the general case is clearly an important objective.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions in classical exchange economies. Our methodological contribution is to focus on a small class of quasi-linear domains and use techniques developed in auction design. This approach enables us to prove dictatorship results for arbitrary numbers of agents in a fairly straightforward way. If the number of agents is more than two, we require the SCFs to satisfy a continuity requirement as well as the non-bossiness assumption. An important open question is whether these assumptions, and the non-bossiness assumption in particular, can be dispensed with.
APPENDIX

Proof of Proposition 1: Let {x
We argue that this allocation is not Pareto-efficient. There must exist an agent i ′ with an allocation (
Fix the allocation of the other agents and other goods and consider the set of Pareto-efficient allocations in the Edgeworth box of agents i and i ′ with total endowments of j and j ′ being Ω
respectively. In this box Pareto-efficient points lie on the diagonal. By fixing agent i ′ 's utility level at
, agent i can be made better off than at x * ij (θ) = 0, x * ij ′ (θ) > 0. Hence, the initial allocation cannot be Pareto-efficient.
To complete the proof of the Proposition consider the following optimization problem for agent i
If agent i is the only agent who obtains positive amounts of the first (m − 1) goods, then we are done. So let T ⊂ N (with |T | > 1 and i ∈ T ) be the set of agents who obtain positive amounts of the first (m − 1) goods. Since for any pair of agents in T the marginal rate of substitution between any two goods j and j ′ (from the first (m − 1) goods) must be equal,
Using (A) and (B) we get
Proof of Proposition 2: We proceed in four steps.
Step 1: Consider a two agent economy with agents i and j and an arbitrary total endowment. We prove the following result. For a fixed profile θ
A Pareto-efficient allocation is a solution to the following optimization problem:
whereū j is a nonnegative number. Now note that by strict monotonicity of the objective function, the maximum is achieved at an allocation (
This constraint can be rewritten as:
2 . This is a strictly decreasing function of x i . Also the level sets of the objective function are strictly decreasing with
exists for all x i < Ω x . From this it can be argued that the level set of the objective function that meets the constraint at x i = 0 must cut the constraint from below. Thus, y * i (θ) > 0 and x * i (θ) = 0 cannot be a Pareto-efficient allocation. Hence, the result follows.
Step 2: Consider the n-agent economy and suppose (x * (θ), y
and Ω
of good x and good y respectively. Fix the the allocation of the other agents. The utility functions of agent i and i ′ are now of the form
Step 1, we know that Pareto-efficient allocations in the two-agent, two-good model are such that if
, agent i can be made better off with a positive amount of good x. This contradicts our assumption that (x * (θ), y * (θ)) is Pareto-efficient. This proves Step 2.
Step 3:
is the set of agents all agents who are allocated a positive amount of good x. Let S ′ (⊂ I) be the agents who are allocated a positive amount of good y.
where each α k , β k1 , β k2 , γ 1 and γ 2 is a Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions and complementary slackness conditions are
From (13) and y i (θ) > 0 it follows that β i2 = 0 and hence using (9) we get γ 2 = 1. Since γ 2 = 1, from (10) and (11) we get α k + β k2 = 1 ∀ k ∈ S \ {i}. By (14) and (15) 
Since by assumption x k > 0 for all k ∈ S, we have β k1 = 0 for all k ∈ S. Now from (7) and (8) we have,
By squaring both sides and simplifying we obtain,
Hence,
This proves
Step 3.
k , which is equivalent to condition (P 1) of this Proposition.
Step 4:
Solving the optimization problem in Step 3 for agent i ′ , we obtain α i ≤ 1. Suppose agent i ′ is the only agent other than i who obtains a positive allocation of good x.
The equality follows from the optimization in Step 3 for agent i ′ . Note that if we allow more agents to obtain positive amount of x, then the denominator in the fraction α
i ′ ) will increase. As a result, the allocation of agent i of good x will decrease further. Hence we have a contradiction to our assumption that 2 → ∆ be a strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient SCF. We will show that either agent i or agent j is a dictator.
The following Claim is an important intermediate step.
Proof of Claim 1: We proceed in three steps.
Step 1:
In order to establish Step 1, we use two observations. 
and hence by (O1), (O2) and Lemma 1(b), we get 1 > y i (a i , θ * j ) > y i (b i , θ * j ) > 0.
Step 2 Step 3: Consider θ is increas-
